There are many studies in the finance and management literature that examine the impact of diversification on performance. Yet, the literature remains inconclusive as for the potential benefits in terms of risk and return. The present study aims to re-examine this issue, while proposing a methodological framework that integrates various bank performance and risk indicators into a single measure of financial strength. Using an international sample of commercial banks, we find that diversification in terms of income, earning assets, and on-and off-balance sheet activities influences positively their financial strength. These results hold when we account for nesting effects, endogeneity, as well as when using an alternative approach for the construction of the financial strength indicator.
Introduction
Corporate diversification has been characterized as a central topic of research in the literature with existing studies investigating various issues like its relationship with ownership, top management characteristics, information asymmetry, and organizational divisionalization, to name a few. Perhaps the most well researched strand of this literature is the one linking diversification and performance (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; Palich et al., 2000) , with early studies going back to the work of Rumelt (1982) . However, this topic continues to be central in the research agenda of banking, finance, and management scholars (e.g. Chakrabarti et al, 2007; Goddard et al., 2008; Elsas et al., 2010) . One potential reason is that despite the large number of studies, the literature has not yet reached maturity, as it is evident by the little agreement that exists at both the theoretical and empirical level (Palich et al., 2000) .
An important issue that has been highlighted in the case of non-financial firms is that while some studies examine the association between diversification and risk-return performance, the vast majority of the literature does not take risk into account (Bettis and Mahajan, 1985) . This is surprising considering the importance of risk in managerial decision making (e.g. Miller and Bromiley, 1990) and the theoretical associations between diversification and risk (see e.g. Chang and Thomas, 1989) . Additionally, the few studies that investigate the risk-return performance traditionally rely on the standard deviation of return on assets as a measure of risk, an approach that has also been used in studies in banking (e.g. Stiroh, 2004; Goddard et al., 2008) . While this risk metric captures the instability of returns, it fails to take into account potential trade-offs, and it does not provide an overall indicator of exposure to the various risks.
Yet, the idea that gains on one dimension must be potentially sacrificed on another dimension (i.e. trade-off) is central in the analysis of financial economics and bank management (Thakor, 2014) .
Some banking studies have partially improved upon this by relating diversification to risk using the Z-score index, an indicator of a bank's probability of insolvency (e.g. Stiroh, 2004; Mercieca et al., 2007) . 1 This index takes into account not only the standard deviation of return on assets but also the average return on assets and the average equity to assets over a fixed time period. Still, the Z-score is not without its drawbacks. First, there is no guidance as for the number of years that have to be used for the calculation of the standard deviation, with many studies relying on just two or three years. Yet, as shown in Delis et al. (2014) the number of periods considered for the construction of the variance component significantly affects the results. In addition, the requirement of having data for numerous continuous years imposes some restrictions on the number of banks that can be eventually assessed with this kind of analysis.
Third, and most importantly, the Z-score focuses on profitability and capitalization ignoring other aspects like liquidity, asset quality, and cost management.
In general, there appears to be limited work in integrating various categories of risk exposures and incorporating risk into performance measures, an approach that could offer the possibility to assess the firm exposures along different dimensions (Miller, 1998; Chang and Thomas, 1989) . At the same time, an increasing number of studies highlight the need to take into account the multidimensionality of performance, instead of focusing on individual measures like 1 Others examine the association between shareholder value and diversification (e.g. Laeven and Levine, 2007; Elsas et al., 2010) . There is no doubt that these studies are very interesting; however, they approach this topic from an entirely different angle, and with specific stakeholders in mind (i.e. shareholders) and they do not consider the financial strength of banks.
profits (see e.g. McKiernan and Morris, 1994; Devinney et al., 2010; Kyrgidou and Syropoulou, 2013) .
2
Motivated by the above discussion, we aim to re-examine the impact of diversification on risk and return, while proposing a methodological framework that integrates various bank characteristics into an overall indicator of financial strength. Thus, we attempt to bring together the literature on diversification and the one on the multidimensional character of firm performance, an issue that has not been properly explored, despite having been suggested as an avenue of future research for over two decades (see Nguyen et al., 1990) . For various reasons discussed below, we opt for an application in the banking; however, our methodological approach may be applied in any industry using appropriate financial ratios or other indicators of risk and performance.
Our analysis consists of two parts. First, we estimate a novel overall financial strength indicator (OFSI) that takes simultaneously into account various elements of bank performance (i.e. profitability, expenses management) and risk (i.e. capital risk, credit risk, liquidity risk).
Thus, we capture those attributes that are taken into account by bank regulators, credit analysts, and equity analysts, in assessing the financial performance and condition of banks (Golin and Delhaise, 2013) . 3 Then, in the second part, we examine whether and how diversification influences banks' overall financial strength.
2 For example, McKiernan and Morris (1994) highlight that ""There as has been a general call for the use of multiple measures (Freeman et al., 1991) to capture 'overall' performance rather than the reliance, as in some studies, on single measures of performance, e.g. profit" (p. S35) . Along the same lines, Devinney et al. (2010) argue that there logical theoretical reasons to believe that performance is fundamentally multidimensional, and they highlight the need for a more robust way of measuring company financial performance. Similarly, Kyrgidou and Spyropoulou (2013) 3 We term our metric indicator of overall financial strength to distinguish it for other measures of performance used in the literature, capturing individual attributes, mainly profitability. Apparently, one could use the term overall financial performance. In some instances, we use the two terms interchangeably in the text. The five elements considered in the present study resemble the ones used in the CAMEL framework to assess the financial condition Using this overall indicator of financial performance has at least three advantages over the use of single financial ratios or risk indicators employed in earlier studies (e.g. ROA, standard deviation of ROA). First, it provides a general picture about the overall financial strength of banks, instead of focusing on individual aspects like profitability or risk, which provide only partial views. Second, the multicriteria, scenario-based evaluation approach that we use for the construction of the OFSI, allows us to simultaneously take into account the conflicting objectives of managers, and examine multiple scenarios with respect to the way that these objectives contribute to bank financial strength. 4 For instance, managers could increase the bank's interest income in the short-run by approving a high interest loan to a borrower with low creditworthiness. However, this strategy will most likely be associated with problems appearing in the form of non-performing loans (i.e. credit risk). Alternatively, they may try to increase bank returns, by decreasing the liquid assets that they hold. However, this may result in liquidity risk.
Nonetheless, prudent managers should aim for profit maximization, while minimizing the nonperforming to loans ratio, and maintaining liquidity, capital adequacy, etc. As discussed above, the adopted multicriteria approach allows us to consider these conflicting goals, and the associated trade-offs, during the estimation process. Third, the decision of managers to diversify, affects various bank attributes, and not only profitability. For example, changing the earning assets portfolio mix, to include more loans and less other earning assets, will impact liquidity since loans are generally considered to be illiquid assets. This decision will also change the total of banks in terms of Capital (i.e. capital risk), Asset quality (i.e. credit risk), Management (i.e. expenses management), Earnings (i.e. profitability) and Liquidity (i.e. liquidity risk). Thus, CAMEL refers to a checklist of the bank's attributes that are viewed as critical in evaluating its financial performance and condition (Golin and Delhaise, 2013) . Building on this general CAMEL framework, supervisory agencies in the United States estimate the CAMEL ratings. However, these ratings are confidential, being disclosed only to senior bank management and to the appropriate supervisory personnel. Thus, in the context of the present study we estimate a new overall financial performance indicator that considers simultaneously the aforementioned bank-specific attributes. 4 Delis et al. (2014) also highlight that financial intermediaries make risky decisions simultaneously with the perception about expected profits and of the level of other bank characteristics, mainly capital and liquidity.
capital ratio of the bank, as loans and let us say bonds are assigned different weights in riskweighted capital regulatory ratios. Finally, a bank that holds higher proportions of loans may have to devote more resources on the screening and monitoring of the quality of its portfolio compared to a bank that invests in bonds and other earning assets, a managerial strategy than can be associated with higher expenses.
There are numerous reasons for which the banking sector provides an interesting case study for our research. First, in recent years we have witnessed great changes in the composition of banks' earning assets portfolio, the relative importance of on-and off-balance sheet activities, and a general shift away from traditional interest income generating activities into non-interest income related services (Stiroh, 2004; Elsas et al., 2010) . Second, the empirical evidence on the diversification of banking institutions provides conflicting results and to some extent, the results depend on the employed measure (e.g. Stiroh, 2004; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010 for whether aggressive diversification strategies in the past resulted in increased risk taking and poor performance that led to the financial crisis (Berger et al., 2010) . 5 By examining an 5 Within this context, DeYoung and Torna (2013) also make an important contribution to the literature by looking at the impact of diversification on bank failures during the recent crisis. However, their study is limited to the US banking sector, and it may not be possible to generalize their findings at an international context, where banks will be declared bankrupt (or saved) under different laws and for potentially different political or regulatory reasons (see Petitjean, 2013; Cole and Cadogan, 2014) . Furthermore, diversification may have a different impact on financial strength (regardless of its definition) in developing and developed countries, as bank managers in the former group of countries may be less efficient in managing non-traditional activities (see e.g. Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010) . There is no doubt that the approach of DeYoung and Torna (2013) allows them to look at really troubled banks, without relying on an estimated risk indicator; however, at the same time this makes their work subject to the general shortcomings of the business failure literature (see Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006) . For example, one needs to classify banks as failed or non-failed and it is difficult to consider the population of "grey zone" banks. Additionally, international sample around the years of the crisis, the present study examines whether or not the diversification strategy of banks proved helpful during this difficult time period.
The rest of the paper of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a background discussion. Section 3 describes the methodological framework used in the present study, and Section 4 presents the variables and the data. Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 concludes.
Background discussion
The resource-based theory of the firm asserts that increasing levels of product diversification should influence performance positively due to economies of scope and scale, and economic quasi-rents, which generate a competitive advantage (see Geringeret et al., 2000) .
Furthermore, firm resources (e.g. financial, human) and know-how (e.g. managerial, technological) can create value when shared across businesses (e.g. Farjoun, 1998; Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) , without being perfectly mobile across firms. Thus, firms that will strategically diversify to take advantage of such resources should perform better than single-business firms and the ones that diversify for less strategic reasons (Palich et al., 2000; Miller, 2006) .
Additionally, this pool of resources provides diversified firms with greater flexibility in terms of sources of debt and equity, since in addition to external sources they can also rely on internally generated resources to cover their capital needs (Lang and Stulz, 1994) . On top of this flexibility, the management of the diversified firm could allocate the resources better than external markets due to information asymmetries (Lang and Stulz, 1994) .
the application of the failure definition to an arbitrarily chosen year or time period involves a certain 'selection bias' and may result in 'contaminated' populations.
Managerial decisions to diversify have often been linked to the aim of decreasing risk (Bettis and Mahajan, 1985) . For example, Chang and Thomas (1989) mention that a firm can diversify into less risky product markets, and the more it diversifies the more it can spread industry-specific risk. Additionally, the lower risk and the associated reduced probability of bankruptcy may have positive implications in terms of the firm's debt capacity and cost of capital (Seth, 1990; Palich et al., 2000) .
All the above suggest that diversification will exercise a positive impact on performance and a negative impact on risk. Yet, the literature also discusses a number of conditions under which diversification will not bring the expected outcomes. These include the strain on top management due to efforts to manage a diverse portfolio of business, coordination costs, organizational diseconomies, internal conflicts, and other inefficiencies that may arise (see Palich et al., 2000) . Assuming that these costs outperform the associated benefits of diversification, then one should expect a negative impact on performance. The diversification strategy may also fail to reduce risk if the new businesses are correlated with existing businesses.
Arguments in the banking literature follow a similar form of reasoning. For example, Barth et al. (2004) outline several theoretical reasons for restricting bank activities (and thus limiting their opportunity to diversity) as well as alternative reasons for allowing banks to participate in a broad range of activities. For example, on the negative side they emphasize among other things the conflicts of interest that arise when banks engage in diverse activities, and the moral hazard problems that are associated with greater opportunities to increase risk through an engagement in a broader range of activities. On the positive side, Barth et al. (2004) discuss the utilization of economies of scale and scope, the potential increase in the franchise value of banks, and the diversification of income sources that could result in more stable banks.
Furthermore, theoretical studies claim that diversification makes it cheaper for institutions to achieve credibility in their role as screeners or monitors (e.g. Diamond, 1984) .
As in the case of research on non-financial firms, the empirical results in the banking literature are also mixed. For example, Stiroh (2004) finds that there is no relationship between the expansion into non-interest income-generating activities and the return on equity. Mercieca et al. (2007) do not find evidence of direct diversification benefits within and across business lines; however, they report an inverse association between non-interest income and bank profitability.
More recent studies, contradict these findings. Using an international sample, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) find that the diversification towards non-interest activities has a positive impact on the return on assets, and Sanya and Wolfe (2011) reach similar conclusions using a sample from eleven emerging economies. Similarly, some studies find that diversification does not translate into reductions in risk (e.g. Demsetz and Strahan, 1997) , others report that banks experience a decrease in risk (e.g. Sanya and Wolfe, 2011; Shim, 2013) , an increase in risk (e.g. Stiroh, 2004 Stiroh, , 2006 Lepetit et al., 2008) , and there are also studies finding that this relationship depends upon the employed measure of risk (e.g. Allen and Jagtiani, 2000; Baele et al., 2007) .
Finally, Acharya et al. (2006) suggest that banks can experience diseconomies of diversification that arise in the form of a worsening of the credit quality of loan portfolio simultaneously with a fall in bank returns, possibly due to worse monitoring, adverse selection, higher overheads, or a combination of these factors. This could explain why some studies report a positive (Chiorazzo et al., 2008) and others a negative association (Stiroh, 2004; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010) between income diversification and risk-adjusted returns.
Methodology

Dependent variable -estimating the overall financial strength indicator
To construct the OFSI we use a scenario-based multicriteria approach, taking into account five financial criteria: the total capital adequacy ratio (TCAR), the problem loans to total loans ratio (PLR), the cost to income ratio (COST), return on assets (ROA), and the liquid assets to deposits and short term funding ratio (LIQR). 6 We select these ratios considering their use by international regulators (e.g., total capital adequacy ratio) and their association to the categories of the CAMEL framework.
In the adopted multicriteria framework, the banks are evaluated through an additive value function of the five aforementioned ratios, i.e.:
( 1) where w TCAR , w PLR , w COST , w ROA , and w LIQR are non-negative tradeoffs of the five ratios, (Keeney and Raiffa, 1993) and has been used in a wide range of evaluation problems under multiple criteria.
To evaluate the financial strength of the banks under different scenarios, as for the weightings of the performance indicators (financial ratios), we follow a simulation approach.
Simulation methods have become popular in multiple criteria decision analysis for handling the uncertainties involved with respect to the set of preferential parameters of evaluation models and/or the data (Lahdelma and Salminen, 2001; Tervonen and Figueira, 2008) . In this study, we follow this approach in order to build a comprehensive evaluation of the banks under different Tervonen and Lahdelma (2007) on the implementation of such simulation-based approaches to multicriteria evaluation problems, we consider a large set of 10,000 scenarios, which is sufficient to achieve robust results. The details for the scenario generation process (i.e., the sampling of random evaluation model) are given in Appendix I.
Under each scenario k, the banks are evaluated with a randomly generated additive model constant. The negative exponential function is commonly used for modelling risk aversion (Kirkwood, 2004) . It is bounded by above by one and its concave form implies that the penalty assigned to negative deviations from the expected rating ( ) outweighs the "premium" associated with positive deviations ( ). For a bank that is consistently classified in the same rating throughout all evaluation scenarios, the risk component equals zero.
In accordance with common practices on bank rating systems (Sahajwala and Van den Bergh, 2000) , the OFSI is scaled between 1 and 5, with higher values indicating better performance. Under this scaling scheme, the risk aversion parameter is specified for each bank so that at the worst possible evaluation case, equals one, i.e.:
With this specification the risk adjustment component for bank ranges in .
Furthermore, given that the risk aversion parameter is a decreasing function of , decreasing absolute risk aversion is assumed. Thus, the risk adjustment is higher for banks that perform poorly on average (i.e., low values of ), whereas for banks that perform better on average the risk adjustment is reduced. Finally, the OFSI is consistent with the second-order stochastic dominance principle (Levy, 2010) . In particular, assuming two banks A and B, such that A second-order stochastically dominates B according to the distributions of the banks' ratings over all evaluation scenarios, then .
Econometric analysis
In the second part of the analysis, the OFSI serves as the dependent variable in the estimation of method to control for the potential endogeneity of diversification.
Variables and data
Diversification indices
As in previous studies, the construction of our diversification indices is restricted by data availability (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2007; Baele et al., 2007 The earning assets-based diversification index is constructed by considering the two major categories of bank earning assets, namely net loans and other earning assets (e.g., Elsas et al., 2010) . Again, we opt for a Herfindhal-Hirshman index of the following form:
where LOAN denotes the net loans and OEA stands for other earning assets (e.g., securities, bonds, etc.). A higher value indicates a more diversified mix. A value of zero reveals a complete concentration, while a value of 0.5 illustrates an even split between loans and other earning assets.
Finally, the balance sheet based diversification index takes into account the values of total assets, and off-balance sheet activities, and it is constructed as follows:
where TAOB denotes the total assets on balance sheet, and OBS stands for off-balance-sheet items such as managed securitized assets reported off-balance sheet, guarantees, acceptances and documentary credits reported off-balance sheet, committed credit lines, and other contingent liabilities. The interpretation of DIV bs is same as the one of DIV asset .
Control variables
In all the regressions, we use the natural logarithm of total assets (LNAS) to control for bank size. Furthermore, we use numerous country-level control variables that capture the macroeconomic environment, regulatory policies, banking and financial sector conditions, and institutional development. Most of them are standard control variables in the banking literature so in what follows we provide only a very brief discussion, whereas further information about 9 We do not include financial ratios as these where considered during the first part of the analysis for the construction of the OFSI. The bank-specific fixed effects allow us to control for other time-invariant bank characteristics not captured in our specifications.
the definition, construction, and sources for the collection of all the data is available in Appendix II. First, we control for the impact of macroeconomic conditions using the real GDP growth (GDPGR) and the inflation rate (INFL). Second, we use indices for regulations that relate to the three pillars of Basel II, namely capital requirements (CAPRQ), private monitoring (PRMON) and supervisory power (OFFPR), as well as to restrictions on bank activities (ACTRS). Third, we control for the general level of economic freedom and institutional development using the composite indicator of the Heritage Foundation (ECONFR). Fourth, we control for various conditions in the banking sector using: (i) the private credit by deposit money banks to GDP ratio (CREDIT), as an indicator of the banking sector's development, (ii) the assets concentration of the three largest banks (CONC), and (iii) the country-level Z-score of the banking sector (TBANKZ), as an indicator of stability.
Data
We collect data from various sources. Bank-specific data are obtained from OSIRIS database of Bureau van Dijk. This database contains information on listed and large unlisted (or delisted)
banks from around the world. Given the international coverage of our study, we focus on commercial banks so as to obtain a more homogenous sample. We start with a sample of approximately 1,600 banks. After excluding banks with missing data and erroneous information we end up with a sample of 1,204 commercial banks operating in 111 countries between 2001 and 2010. This results in an unbalanced panel dataset of 8,051 observations. We complement this dataset with various country-level variables that we collect from various sources (see Appendix II). Table 1 presents descriptive statistics about the variables that we use in both parts of the analysis. Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 Around Here] The annual averages are presented, together with the corresponding coefficients of variation. The coefficient of variation provides a measure of the OFSI dispersion among the banks in each year.
Empirical results
Overall financial strength indicator
However, the coefficient of variation does not indicate the diversity of the banks' ratings over the different scenarios considered for the calculation of the OFSI, as explained earlier.
In that regard, for each bank we have also calculated the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) to measure the diversity of its ratings over the 10,000 specifications of the additive evaluation model (i.e., evaluation scenarios). Following the notation introduced earlier, the HHI for a bank-year observation i, is expressed as follows:
The HHI equals one when the bank-year observation i is consistently assigned into a specific rating class across all evaluation scenarios, whereas when there is complete uncertainty on the ratings (i.e., ), then HHI equals 0.2. Table 3 presents the average HHI for all bank observations in each year.
[Insert Table 3 Around Here] Table 4 and Figure 1 provide some insight into the relationship between the OFSI and the financial ratios that constitute its building blocks. Table 4 shows the averages of the ratios for different ranges of the OFSI, together with the Pearson's correlation coefficient between the ratios and the OFSI. Figure 1 provides a more detailed graphical illustration of the relationship between the OFSI and the financial ratios (the figures show the average OFSI at 20 bins of the ratios defined by their 5, 10, …, 95, 100% percentiles). The results indicate that ROA is the ratio most strongly related to the OFSI, followed by PLR. The averages of the ratios for different OFSI ranges follow a monotonic trend, which is confirmed from the illustrations in Figure 1 .
[Insert Table 4 and Figure 1 Around Here]
Regressions -base results
Tables 5 to 7 present the regression results of the fixed effects model with robust standard errors clustered at the bank level. We start with a simple model (column 1) that includes the natural logarithm of a bank's total assets, real GDP growth and inflation, so that we can make maximum use of our sample. Then, we estimate additional models, where we control for alternative country-specific factors. Note that the number of observations varies along the regressions, depending on the missing values for the country-level variables.
All three measures of diversification, namely DIV inc (Table 5) , DIV asset (Table 6) , and DIV bs (Table 7) , enter the regressions with a positive and statistically significant coefficient.
Thus, diversification in terms of income, earning assets portfolio mix, and on-and off-balance sheet activities tends to improve the overall financial strength of the banks.
[Insert Tables 5-7 Around Here]
In column (2), we add the four regulatory variables. The inclusion of these variables in the regressions has no impact on the relationship between diversification and OFSI. With regards to the regulatory variables, we observe that private monitoring and capital requirements have a positive and statistically significant impact on financial strength. However, supervisory power and restrictions on activities do not appear to influence the OFSI. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the inclusion of additional variables in the regression in column 5 results in an insignificant CAPRQ. The insignificance of most of the regulatory variables poses some questions as for the effectiveness of regulations. However, it should be stressed out that while there are studies revealing a significant association of these variables with bank outcomes (e.g., Pasiouras et al., 2009 ) others mention that many of them, and especially capital requirements and supervisory power are not significant determinants of bank stability, development, net interest margin or performance (see Barth et al., 2004; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2004) . One potential reason is that these indices capture regulations at the books and not what actually happens in practice.
Thus, these indices cannot reveal potential shortcomings in the actual implementation of the regulations. 10 Nonetheless, one could also easily argue that our results, which cover the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] , illustrate exactly what we observed during the financial crisis. That is the existing regulations did not serve their purpose in safeguarding against excessive risk taking in banking institutions around the world.
In column (3) we add the index of economic freedom. This variable enters the regression with a positive coefficient; however, this is statistically insignificant in most of the specifications and it has no impact on our main findings. The specification in column (4) includes three additional variables that account for various conditions in the banking sector. We observe that lower credit to GDP ratio, lower concentration, and higher stability of the banking sector as measured with the Z-score increase the OFSI. The impact of diversification on OFIS remains positive and statistically significant. Finally, the specification in column (5) includes all the variables in the regression, to account for potential omitted variables bias. Our findings remain the same. Thus, it appears that the impact of diversification on bank financial strength is not influenced by the control variables that we use. Despite this observation, we continue our analysis by considering some additional country-variables that we discuss in our sensitivity tests in the following section.
Sensitivity analysis
Exploring the impact of the crisis and additional country-specific attributes
To mitigate further any concerns about omitted variable bias, we consider some additional country-level variables that may be correlated with OFSI, by adding them one at a time to the equation of column (5) in Tables 5 to 7 . In particular, we consider: (i) the ratio of central bank assets to GDP, (ii) the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP, (iii) an alternative indicator of institutional development (INSTEDV) that replaces ECONFR, while measuring voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption and (iv) a sub-index of INSTDEV, that serves as an enforcement index (ENFIND) and focuses on regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption. Our results remain robust to the inclusion of these variables in the regressions (see Tables 8 and 9 ).
[Insert Tables 8 and 9 Around Here] Furthermore, we consider a dummy variable for developing and transition countries (DEVGTRANS =1) in an attempt to account for potential characteristics that differentiate them from major advanced and advanced countries (DEVGTRANS=0), and we interact this variable with the diversification indices (DEVGTRANS*DIV). As shown in Table 10 , we find a positive and statistically significant interaction in the case of income, a positive but insignificant interaction in the case of assets, and a negative and statistically significant interaction in the case of OBS. 11 Thus, banks in less developed countries benefit more than the ones in developed countries from income diversification but they benefit less when they diversify their activities in terms of on-balance-sheet and off-balance sheet activities. 12 To some extent this finding could be explained by the potential inexperience of bank managers in developing and transition countries in handling OBS activities, and it is partially consistent with the results of Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2010) who find that OBS activities improve the profit efficiency of banks in major advanced countries; however, they worsen the profit efficiency of banks in developing countries.
[Insert Table 10 Around Here]
Finally, we include a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the years 2007 to 2010 and the value of zero for the rest of the years (see Table 11 ). 13 Thus, we aim to capture the impact of the crisis. Furthermore, to examine the role of diversification over this period, we also use the interaction of CRISIS with the diversification indices. As expected, we find that CRISIS has a negative impact on OFSRI. What is interesting though is the positive and statistically significant impact of the interaction of the crisis dummy with DIV inc and DIV asset . Thus, income and earning asset diversification appears to mitigate the adverse effect of the crisis on bank financial strength.
[Insert Table 11 Around Here]
Simultaneous control for alternative measures of diversification
In the so far discussed results, consistent with earlier studies, we included the diversification indices in the analysis one at a time. The main reason for this is that the simultaneous inclusion of all the indices in the regressions could result in some form of double counting. For example, the share of interest income and non-interest income will depend upon the decision of banks to diversify between loans (i.e. interest income generating activities) and other earning-assets (i.e. non-interest income generating activities) or more generally on the diversification between on-and off-balance sheet (i.e. fee income generating) activities.
However, considering that the correlation coefficients between the three indices turned out to be rather low, we also estimated our base model while including them simultaneously in the regressions. The results in Table 12 remain the same.
[Insert Table 12 Around Here]
Accounting for nesting effects
In this section we employ the HLM approach, which simultaneously models regressions at both the bank-and country-level. Thus, by modelling each level of the hierarchy, multilevel models consider that banks within a country are more similar to one another than banks from different countries. The model is fitted using an interactive maximum likelihood algorithm in which the fixed and random effects are estimated simultaneously until the model converges. 14 In its combined form the model can be written as follows:
Where OFSI, X and Z are defined as before. The random variables u i,j and e j allow the intercept (α+u ij +e ,j ) to be random and unique to every bank and country. The term ε i,jt is the residual. So, the above model assumes that the intercept is random and all slope coefficients are fixed, implying that all slope parameters are identical across banks and countries. However, this model can be extended so that some coefficients can be specified to differ across banks and/or countries in a stochastic manner. As the main question of the present study is to explore the relationship between diversification and financial strength at the bank-level, it could be argued that this relationship is not identical across banks. Therefore, we estimate one more specification which incorporates, in addition to the random intercepts, a random coefficient for the effect of DIV ijt on OFSI ijt , while all other coefficients remain fixed. Thus, this approach yields both fixed and random effects estimates for the bank-level diversification index. In this case, the above equation becomes: 14 We also estimated the model using maximum restricted likelihood (REML). Our main results hold.
The results of a likelihood-ratio test favour the model that allows for a random bankspecific regression line over the model that allows only for a bank-specific shift. In all the cases, the diversification indices enters with a positive and statistically significant coefficient, indicating that controlling for potential dependency due to nesting effects does not influence our main findings (see Table 13 ).
[Insert Table 13 Around Here]
Accounting for endogeneity
The potential endogeneity of diversification has been recently discussed in the banking literature (e.g. Goddard et al., 2008; Elsas et al., 2010) . The underlying idea is that diversification itself might be an endogenous choice, and some of the observed association between income, earning assets and on-off balance sheet diversification and OFSI could be due to the reason that safer banks choose to diversify more across the various categories. In other words, so far we have assumed that diversification influences bank safety, but not vice versa.
Therefore, we re-estimate our model using instrumental variable regressions to control for the endogeneity between OFSI and diversification. Ideally we would like to use exogenous variables as instruments; however, it is very challenging to find strictly exogenous regressors to econometrically account for a potential endogeneity. 15 Therefore, we follow numerous earlier studies and we use lagged variables of diversification as instruments (e.g. Elsas et al., 2010) With this instrument alone our equations will be exactly identified and this allows receiving under-identification and weak identification tests for the validity of the instrument. To receive the results of an over-identification test for our estimated models, we complement the lagged diversification with a bank-specific indicator of merger and acquisition activity (MERG). 16 As discussed in Laeven and Levine (2007) and Elsas et al. (2010) , mergers can be related to diversification since they constitute an important strategic instrument for banks to manage their level of diversification.
We use the LIML method Rubin, 1949, 1950) that is well suited for dynamic panel estimations and may perform better than 2SLS and GMM in various occasions (see Baltagi, 2005; Bascle, 2008; Alonso-Borrego and Arellano, 1999) . 17 Eventually, the OFSI is now regressed on its lag, the instrumented diversification and the remaining control variables. As can be seen in Table AIII .7 the above mentioned instruments pass the under-identification, weak identification and over-identification tests; thus, being valid instruments on the basis of these criteria. The results in Table 14 indicate that the instrumented diversification indicators enter the regressions with a positive and statistically significant coefficient.
Another potential source of endogeneity in the above setting may be the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable (i.e. OFSI) as control variable in the regression specification. To check for the robustness of our results, we also estimate our regression specification without the lagged dependent variable (see e.g. Aebi et al., 2012) and we find that our main results remain the same.
[Insert Table 14 Around Here]
Alternative approach for the estimation of the OFSI
In constructing the OFSI discussed in the previous section, we did not impose any assumptions on the ordering of the financial ratios with respect to their relative significance. In this section, we test a slightly different alternative approach that is similar to the one used by Moody's in the estimation of their bank financial strength rating (BFSR). In particular, the simulations for the weightings of the ratios are now performed assuming that the cost to income ratio (an indicator of the banks' efficiency) is assigned a lower weight compared to the profitability (ROA), liquidity (LIQR), capital adequacy (TCAR), and asset quality (PLR) ratios, i.e.,
. Furthermore, the five dimensions of the banks' performance are assigned a total weight of 70%, whereas the remaining 30% is assigned to the lowest performing factor (which differs between the banks), after combining profitability and cost efficiency. This adjustment puts additional emphasis on the dimension where a bank performs worst. Thus, the evaluation model (1) is now expressed as follows:
The performance scores obtained from this evaluation approach are very similar to the ones of the OFSI model used in the previous sections (Pearson and Spearman correlations: 0.95; mean root-square deviation: 0.28), and the results of the regressions remain the same.
Conclusions and implications
The question of whether banks should focus on traditional banking or whether they should offer a wide array of services has generated a lively debate among academics, policy makers, and practitioners. Theory and existing empirical evidence provide conflicting views. In practice, we observed that over the last decade numerous banks around the world tented to diversify and enhance the portfolio of services that they offer. This diversification may influence various bank attributes; nonetheless, one of the most important questions is how it influences the overall financial strength of banks.
This study attempted to answer this question by using a sample of over 1,000 banks operating in 111 countries. First, we constructed a novel overall financial strength indicator taking into account various elements of bank risk and performance. Then, we examined the impact of bank diversification in terms of income, earning assets, and on-and-off balance sheet activities diversity on financial strength.
Our main finding is that diversification improves the overall financial strength of banks.
This holds for different forms of diversification, including income, earning assets portfolio mix, and on-and off-balance sheet activities. Furthermore, we revealed that income diversification can be more beneficial for banks operating in less developed countries. Nonetheless, we observed the opposite in the case of diversification between off-balance sheet and on-balance sheet activities. Additionally, the results showed that the impact of the crisis on financial strength can be less severe with the use of earning assets diversification. We performed a number of robustness tests, by controlling for various country-specific variables, and we also used alternative techniques for the estimation of both the overall financial strength indicator and the regressions. Our main finding remained the same across the various estimations.
These findings have important implications for bank managers who have a substantial financial and professional interest in their firm, regulators whose job is to monitor that bank managers behave in such a way that ensure safe and sound banking practices, and customers whose relationship with the bank could be jeopardized by deterioration in banks' financial strength. For example, at the policy level, the regulatory restrictions on bank activities vary widely across countries. Our results suggest that policy makers should direct their efforts toward ensuring adequate bank diversification. At the firm level, we find that diversification improves overall financial strength, implying that managers should perceive diversification as an important strategic decision. However, our findings in relation to the development status of the economy show that some banks in some countries may be favoured more by following specific forms of diversification, which are possibly aligned better with their expertise, along with technological advances, and managerial know-how in the industry. Similarly, the results in relation to the financial crisis, also point to the conclusion that managers choosing specific forms of diversification over others may end up managing a safer and sounder bank. 
